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CLOSING THE COURTROOM TO THE PUBLIC:
WHOSE RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED?*
Thomas F. Liottit
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a growing number of instances
where the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the First
Amendment freedom of the press have come into conflict in
cases concerning the right of access to criminal proceedings.
The competing interests at stake in these cases have been
called "two of the most cherished policies of our civilization."'
The Supreme Court of the United States has tried to reach a
balance between the rights that the two amendments grant
and all of the policies they embody. They have done this
against the backdrop of the firmly established principle that
the "authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment
rights, ranking one as superior to the other."2 Yet, in deciding
©1997 Thomas F. Liotti All Rights Reserved.
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Article.
See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 611 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
2 Id. at 561 (White, J., concurring). Recently the public has observed a balanc-
ing of the competing rights of the media with the rights of the accused in United
States v. McVeigh, 96-CR-68-M, 1997 U.S. Dist. LENIS 3028 (D. Colo. March 17,
1997). See Robert G. Morvillo, Teleuision and the Public Trial, N.Y.L.J., April 1,
1997 at 3 (this article describes the alternatives for full closure of the courtrooms
as discussed by the Second Circuit in Ayala v. Speckard, 89 F.3d 91 (2d Cir.
1996), which are "() a strategically placed chalkboard that would have shielded
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these cases, one amendment must be the victor; either the
press receives access to the information it seeks and the defen-
dant feels his right to a fair trial has been compromised, or the
press is denied access and feels that it is the victim of govern-
ment sponsored censorship.3
The result of the Supreme Court's efforts has been a line
of cases that are often confusing to practitioners, and do not
always lend themselves to certain application by lower courts.
This Article contends that this has happened for three reasons.
First, by trying to develop a unified theory for access to crimi-
nal proceedings, courts have failed to recognize that one
amendment must ultimately win out over the other. Second,
this lack of recognition has led the Supreme Court to apply
First Amendment principles to cases properly decided on Sixth
Amendment grounds and vice-versa. Finally, the facts of the
cases addressing the issue have made the Court's job more
difficult by presenting it with atypical situations when it needs
to develop a theory that applies to all cases. This Article at-
tempts to lend clarity to this muddled situation.
The author submits that the decisions in the area of access
to criminal proceedings fall into two separate and distinct lines
of cases that have developed side by side over time. The first
line, which the author will call the Estes line, consists of cases
where the press has previously been part of the criminal pro-
ceedings. In these instances, the press has had access to infor-
mation contained in the proceedings, or the information they
seek does not impact directly on the defendant. In this line
the officer from view, (2) asking Ayala who he wanted to remain in the courtroom,
then causing the prosecution to show why any such people should not be present,
and (3) disguising the officer during his testimony." Id. at 7. However, in an en
banc ruling, the Second Circuit aligned itself with "New York's highest court in
declaring that trial judges who close courtrooms for the testimony of undercover
police need not, on their own, consider alternatives to such closures," in Ayala v.
Speckard, 89 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Deborah Pines, Closing the Court-
room Permitted: In Banc Ruling On Criteria Aligns the Circuit with State's Top
Court, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at 1 ("Judge Newman also found that after the trial
judges were asked to approve the closings for police testimony the judges had no
additional obligation, on their own, to consider alternatives that were not proposed
by the parties.") Id. at 6.
' See Thomas F. Liotti, Witness Protection Can Threaten Due Process, NATVL
L.J., Sept. 1, 1997, at A17 (suggesting that closing the courtroom violates the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); see also Steven Fisher, Closing the Court,
N.Y.L.J, Jan. 23, 1997.
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there are the following cases: Estes v. Texas,4 Sheppard v.
Maxwell,5 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart' and Press En-
terprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County
("Press Enterprise 1').7 Here, First Amendment principles gov-
ern and there is a presumption of open proceedings. The defen-
dant, asserting his Sixth Amendment rights, would have to
overcome this presumption.
The second line, which the author will call the Oliver line,
is composed of cases where the press has not gathered any
information from the criminal proceedings. In this line there
are the following cases: In re Oliver,8 Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale,9 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the
County of Norfolk,"0 Waller v. Georgia," and Press Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County ("Press
Enterprise Il").'2 In these cases, Sixth Amendment principles
should control and the press has the burden of showing that
the public requires contemporaneous access to the proceedings.
In Part I, this Article will briefly discuss the two amend-
ments that have come to fix the limits of the public's right of
access to criminal proceedings. What are the general purposes
of these amendments? Whom were the Framers of the Consti-
tution seeking to benefit by enshrining these principles in the
Bill of Rights?
Part II will chronologically outline the current law on
public access to the courts. As the author does this, he will
take note of the interests of the parties involved in the crimi-
nal proceedings, explain where the Court found the proper
basis for deciding the case and where they went wrong, as well
as how the Court could have decided the case to obtain the
same outcome while developing a consistent line of jurispru-
dence. The author will address the cases in chronological order
because he believes it is important to see how the right to
4 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
5 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
7 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press Enterprise 11.
' 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
' 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
'0 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
* 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
' 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press Enterprise I1.
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access doctrine has developed. It is easier to see where the
Court decided the cases correctly and where they did not.
In Part III, the author will outline how the law has been
applied in both the Second Circuit and in New York State.
Finally, the author will conclude by applying this paradigm to
two cases: Ayala v. Speckard,3 a case recently decided by the
Second Circuit and currently awaiting an en bane reargument
determination; and People v. Ramos" which is a case current-
ly awaiting decision by the New York Court of Appeals. Both
cases appear to be on their way to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
I. THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution, as originally ratified, was a reaction to
the weak central government existing under the Articles of
Confederation, which was determined to be inadequate for the
new Union's needs. Still wary of the unlimited and arbitrary
power of the King, the substance of the Constitution establish-
es a centralized government with precisely enumerated powers,
separated among the branches of government so that none can
dominate over the others. By designating the powers of govern-
ment in this manner, the Framers were able to correct the
shortcomings of the Articles while implementing the central
purpose of the document: to restrain the exercise of these pow-
ers by government officials so that certain individual rights
may be preserved.
The Bill of Rights maintained this theme"5 by subse-
quently adding a list of rights reserved for the people. 6 Some
13 89 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996).
14 1997 WL 362871 (1997). The case was heard with a companion case People
v. Ayala.
15 See, e.g., Hon. Loren A. Smith, Introduction To Symposium On Regulatory
Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 525, 526 (1995) (stating that "the very purpose of the
Bill of Rights. is to protect the citizen against the government"); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (asserting that "[tihe very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of mAjorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.").
" It is interesting to note that the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights
were not new to the colonies. Eight state constitutions gathered these rights into
separate provisions called a Declaration of Rights. Connecticut and Rhode Island,
for example, had these rights in their original charter from England. The most
[Vol. 63: 501
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of these amendments detailed very specific rights," while oth-
ers were a conglomeration of specific rights expressing a larger
idea. The two principal amendments at issue here, the First
and Sixth Amendments, are in this latter category. It is impor-
tant to note that these rights are conditional. For example,
there is no First Amendment right to incite a riot, to urge
another person to commit a crime, to unreasonably interfere
with pedestrian or vehicular traffic by speaking and causing a
crowd to gather, or to establish and practice a religion which
causes the death of its believers through religious rituals.
Thus, the rights of the First Amendment are constantly bal-
anced against the good of the orderly administration of govern-
ment.
A. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature of the cause of the accusation; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence.
The Framers fashioned this amendment to protect against
many of the excesses of the European governments. '8 The pre-
dominant principle expressed is that the government should
safeguard fair trials'9 in order to provide for a reliable and
influential of the states' Bill of Rights was the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776
which greatly influenced the final document that was ratified by the thirteen new
states.
7 For example, the Third Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "N]o soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed
by law."
18 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948) (noting that the "Anglo-Ameri-
can distrust for secret trials" was born out of the experience of the Spanish Inqui-
sition, English Court of Star Chamber and the French monarchy's use of the lettre
de cache).
19 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (noting that the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to ensure a fair trial).
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impartial determination of guilt." As will be seen in a brief
survey of the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment, these
rights belong to the criminal defendant, rather than the public.
1. The Right to Counsel
Over the past sixty years, the Supreme Court has gradu-
ally expanded the reach of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to ensure that individuals do not face the loss of liberty
without being able to properly defend themselves against crim-
inal charges. In 1938, the Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment required that individuals be provided counsel in all feder-
al criminal cases. 1 In 1942 the Court held that counsel had to
be provided to state court defendants if failure to furnish coun-
sel would lead to denial of fundamental fairness.2 In 1963,
the Court held that the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment required states to provide counsel for
indigents for at least one appealY. In the same year, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the
states, therefore, they had to provide indigent defendants coun-
sel in felony prosecutions.' The right to counsel was then ex-
tended to include all misdemeanor cases which actually result
in imprisonment.'
Waiver of the right to counsel rests solely in the hands of
the defendant. The role of a court or the prosecution is to pro-
tect the defendant by making sure that the defendant's waiver
is a knowing and intelligent one. The prosecution must
prove the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
20 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 557 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
21 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
24 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979),
26 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). See also People v. Hob-
son, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1976).
[Vol. 63: 501
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known right or privilege"' and courts are constitutionally
required to "indulge in every reasonable presumption against
waiver."'
2. Speedy Trial
The requirement that a criminal trial be conducted with-
out delay must be balanced against the right of an accused as
well as a prosecutor to prepare their respective cases before
going to trial. What is interesting about the right to a speedy
trial is that, depending on the facts and circumstances of a
given case, a delay in trial proceedings could advantage either
the prosecution or the defense.' As a result, the balancing
test fashioned by the Supreme Court measures the conduct of
both.0
However, for several reasons, it appears that the right to a
speedy trial is meant to protect the defendant. First, the defen-
dant may make a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right
but the prosecution may not. Second, the purposes of a speedy
trial enunciated by the Supreme Court focus on the impact of
delay on the criminal defendant.3' Finally, some legislatures
have enacted statues that mandate that a defendant be
brought to trial within a given time. 2
3. Trial by Jury
The fundamental right to trial by jury was secured to
Englishmen by the Magna Carta. Even before the United
States Supreme Court began to constitutionalize the require-
ment of trial by jury, it was taken for granted in virtually all
' Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 40-. (1977) (citation omitted); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (citation omitted).
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
oId. at 530.
31 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378 (1969) (stating that the purposes of a
speedy trial are: (1) that a person may suffer 'undue and oppressive incarcera-
tion"; (2) a prisoner as well as an unconfined person could experience the 'anxiety
and concern accompanying public incarceration"; (3) imprisonment could impair an
accused's ability to prepare a defense).




jurisdictions as a matter of state law.3 Even as a criminal
defendant has become cloaked with numerous procedural
protections,. no one can doubt that a jury is still necessary to
serve as a check against the exercise of arbitrary government
powers.
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed to the extent it
existed at common law, and is applicable to nonpetty offens-
es.' There is no constitutional right to waive a jury and be
tried before a judge. 5 However, the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that where a defendant may not waive a jury without
the prosecution's assent, there are circumstances which would,
as a matter of fundamental fairness, require a trial before a
judge. 6 Moreover, some states allow a defendant to waive a
jury as a matter of right and, as harsh as this may seem, a
defendant may waive the right to be tried by a jury with a
guilty plea.
B. The First Amendment
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, bnd to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
The Framers felt that this amendment would ensure a republi-
can government and direct its benefits towards the public. The
overriding principle expressed was that the government should
safeguard for the public an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas. 7 However, this is not an idle obligation. The govern-
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
" Id. at 161-62. Later, in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970), the
Court defined petty offenses as a offense punishable by more than six months in
jail.
33 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965).
'6 See id. at 37-38.
'7 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J,, dissent-
ing) (asserting that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (affrming Holmes's rationale that "[iut is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail.").
[Vol. 63:501
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ment must often take affirmative acts to ensure a healthy
caldron of speech. The First Amendment requires the govern-
ment to encourage attention to public issues and promote di-
versity of views. To this end, the government must protect the
public's access to information."
There is legal protection for the free flow of information
between private citizens. The paradigm of protection of speech
and publication is that of the shield. The government is pre-
vented from affirmatively burdening the private flow in infor-
mation, but there is no constitutional requirement to provide
information for the knowledge of private citizens.
Within First Amendment doctrine, three commonly accept-
ed rights suggest that the Supreme Court had tacitly ac-
knowledged a public "right to know": a right to receive infor-
mation over government objection, a right to gather informa-
tion for purposes of publication, and a right of access to public
facilities. Upon close examination, however, none of these
rights truly provided the press or public with any entitlement
to extract from a reluctant sovereign any information the sov-
ereign did not choose to provide.39
The "right to receive" cases established that otherwise per-
missible speech could not be effectively restrained by denying a
speaker an audience. In 1969 the Supreme Court announced
that "[lt is now well established that the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas." But this right
was never more than the right of a willing recipient to obtain
information from a "willing speaker."' In no way had the Su-
preme Court recognized an affirmative right to obtain infor-
mation on demand from an unwilling private or public source.
In sum, the doctrine provided little authority for a right of
access to a judicial proceeding intentionally closed by a trial
judge pursuant to state statute.
, See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (stating that the
government must defend access to a broad range of ideas so that each person can
decide which deserve "expression, consideration, and adherence').
See Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search
for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 497 (1980).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
41 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
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The "right to gather" cases were equally unsuccessful in
establishing an affirmative right of access to a criminal trial.
Despite assertions by the Supreme Court suggesting an implic-
it recognition of an independent First Amendment right to
gather information for purposes of publication,42 the Court
has never resolved a case on that basis. The direct claim that
the information-gathering functions of the press were privi-
leged was presented in three cases decided by the Supreme
Court during the 1970s. 3 However, in each instance Court
refused to extend such protection to an otherwise lawful pro-
cess that did not directly restrain or punish the very act of
publication."
The seminal case which stands for this proposition is
Branzburg v. Hayes.4 Branzburg was an investigative jour-
nalist who received a grand jury subpoena compelling him to
testify and reveal confidential sources for his news articles."
He argued that forcing him to reveal his anonymous infor-
mants would deter such sources from entrusting information in
him, thereby imposing an indirect burden on the constitutional
role of an informing press. Justice White, writing for the
Court, appeared to concede much to the Free Press Clause
argument, stating: "Nor is it suggested that news gathering
does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."47 However, in the final analysis the Court
merely drew a line between the accumulation and publication
of information.48 The Court reasoned that the process of gath-
ering information from confidential sources was entitled to no
constitutional protection.49 This was an explicit rejection of
the press claim to an independent right to gather information.
42 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
" Id.
4 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This case was followed by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 347 (2d Cir. 1988).
46 Id. at 667-69.
47 Id. at 681.
" Id. at 681-82.
49 Id. at 708.
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The most categorical rejection of using the First Amend-
ment as a sword to gain access to a criminal trial occurred in
three cases decided by the Supreme Court in the mid-1970s. 0
In each case, the press attempted to assert a right of access to
prison facilities for the purposes of gathering information. Pell
v. Procunier5' and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 2 decided
together, concerned regulations prohibiting journalists from
obtaining interviews with inmates of their choice. The press
plaintiffs alleged that the effective denial of access to inmates
having information relating to prison conditions was an uncon-
stitutional burden on their right to gather and publish news.
The Court found that access to such information was not total-
ly denied in either case because the prisons in question permit-
ted members of the press to visit the institutions and interview
randomly selected inmates. Therefore, the Court reasoned that
the press had access to information that was available to the
public. The Court defined the issue as one in which the press
sought to claim a privilege superior to the general public. Jus-
tice Stewart's opinion assumed that the general public had no
constitutionally protected right of access to government facili-
ties. Therefore, he inferred that the press, even when viewed
as the representative of public, had no independent right to
information that could be denied to the public.'
This issue arose again in Houchins v. KQED, Inc." An
inmate at a county jail had committed suicide in an area of a
facility notorious for numerous "rapes, beatings and adverse
physical conditions." 5 This area of the prison was not open to
members of the public under any circumstances, and KQED
o Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
5" 417 U.S. 817, 819-20 (1974).
52 417 U.S. 843, 844-85 (1974).
Justice Stewart asserted that
[ilt is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out source3 of
information not available to members of the general public .... It is
quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon gov-
ernment the affirmative duty to make available to journalists source of
information not available to members of the public generally. That propo-
sition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any deci-
sion of this Court.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35.
" 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
55 Id. at 5.
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was denied permission to enter and film it. The trial court
enjoined the prison from enforcing its no-access policy, ruling
that the press had to be provided with access at reasonable
times and under reasonable conditions." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction,
finding that the "no greater access" doctrine of Pell and Saxbe
was not controlling in the circumstance of total closure to both
press and public.57
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding.
Chief Justice Burger," again cast the issue as one of mere
comparative access.59 The Chief Justice explained the "impor-
tance of informed public opinion and the traditional role of a
free press as a source of public information"0 did not amount
to a press right of access to information. He noted that al-
though there is protection afforded the media to communicate
information once it is obtained, the government does not have
to provide the media with information or access to it.61 This
seemed to repudiate any recognition of the press' claim to ac-
cess.
62
II. THE LAW ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE COURTS
A. Supreme Court Cases
In In re Oliver,63 the defendant was testifying before a
Michigan Circuit Court judge conducting a "one man grand
jury" that was investigating gambling and official corrup-
6' Id. at 6.
5' KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1
(1978).
58 The case was decided by a 4-3 vote with Justice Stewart concurring sepa-
rately. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 2. Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not take part
in the decision.
"' Id. at 3. See also The Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 762 F.
Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
' Id. at 9 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
81 Id. See also Heller v. Woodward, 735 F. Supp. 996, 998 (D. N.M. 1990).
2 "This Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of
access to all sources of information within government control. Nor does the ratio-
nale of the decisions upon which respondents rely lead to the implication of such
a right." Id.
333 U.S. 257 (1948).
[Vol. 63: 501
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tion."4 The judge did not feel that the defendant's story
"jell[ed]" with the story of prior witnesses.' As a result, the
judge immediately charged the defendant with contempt, con-
victed him and sentenced him to jail for 60 days." In its anal-
ysis, the Supreme Court began by tracing the history of the
right to a public trial. It concluded that common law traditions
showed that the right to a public trial developed in order to
prevent the use of the courts as a tool of persecutionY' This
was accomplished by contemporaneous review; the public act-
ing as a powerful deterrent upon the abuse of judicial pow-
er.' The Court concluded that, in this setting, the defendant
was not a witness in a secret grand jury, rather, he was the ac-
cused in a contempt proceeding.'o Therefore, the Court held
that the method used to sentence the defendant had to com-
port with the Fourteenth Amendment and the procedural safe-
guards embodied in due process rights. °
The Court next addressed the right to a public trial in a
very different setting. The funeral of President Kennedy dis-
played the ability of television to bring the American public
emotional images. By 1965, television was no longer a new
technology, having spread into most, if not all, corners of the
country. Against this backdrop, the Court would decide two
cases concerning the friction between publicity and the crimi-
nal trial.
In Estes v. Texas,"' the defendant was on trial for swin-
dling. The massive publicity the case received brought it na-
tional attention.72 The trial was captured by television and
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259.
Id. The defendant did not have the benefit of counsel, time to prepare a
defense, the ability to cross-examine other witnesses or call witnesses on his own
behalf to rebut the charge against him. Id.
67 Id. at 270.
Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 265, 278. (noting that summary trials for contempt have not been re-
garded as an exception to the rule against secret trials).
"' Id. at 273. The Court held that the defendant had been deprived of his
liberty by the procedure used in the case, which did not afford the defendant
these constitutional protections. Id. at 278.
7' 381 U.S. 532 (1965). See also Zaehringer v. Brewer, 635 F.2d 734, 738 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Ramirez, 524 F.2d 283, 286 (10th Cir. 1975) (This
case was never followed by the Second Circuit).
Id. at 535. The pretrial hearings were covered by radio, television and news
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newsreel photographers who were stationed in a booth special-
ly constructed in the rear of the courtroom.7" Portions of the
trial and the preliminary hearings were regularly broad-
casted. 4
The Court began its discussion by laying out the compet-
ing interests in the case. First, the Court noted that the right
to a public trial belongs to the criminal defendant, and that its
purpose is to assure a fair trial.75 Next, it grappled with the
ability of the press to provide coverage of an event. It conclud-
ed that in order to safeguard the defendant's right to a fair
trial, the privileges granted by the First Amendment, however
important they may be to the functioning of our government,
must not be allowed to interfere with the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice system.76
The Court focused on the importance of the character of
criminal proceedings to the proper functioning of the trial
process.77 The Court noted that the intrusion of the press into
the atmosphere of the trial prejudiced the defendant's fair trial
rights. The majority observed that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to demonstrate actual prejudice in these situa-
tions.7" However, it did not feel this was necessary.79 Based
photography. The Court noted that the pretrial publicity comprised eleven volumes
of press clippings. Id. at 535-36.
"' Id. at 537. The entire trial was allowed to be filmed without sound. Howev-
er, because of continued objections live broadcasting was limited to opening and
closing statements of the state as well as the return of the jury's verdict, al-
though, at the defendant's request, the closing remarks of the defense counsel
were not permitted to be filmed. Id.
" Id. at 537-38. The news anchors would use the footage as the backdrop of
their report. On one occasion, the videotapes of the pretrial hearing were rebroad-
cast in place of the late movie. Id.
75 Id. at 538-39.
78 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539-40.
Id. at 540.
7' Id. at 546. However, the Court did detail four ways in which the presence of
the press could prejudice a trial. First, the Court felt that the mere presence of
the press cameras had the most prejudicial effect. The mere presence of television
or still cameras tells the jury that this is not the average case. The Court noted
that this type of notoriety enhances the chance of prejudice to the point where it
was "highly probable that it will have a direct bearing on his [sic] vote as to guilt
or innocence." Moreover, the press' presence adds to the distractions both inside
and outside the courtroom. The actions of the press could influence the jurors had
it not been for the press' coverage of the day's events.
Second, the Court noted that the press will affect the quality of testimony.
Witnesses become more nervous or audacious, and focus on whether or not their
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on this analysis the Court concluded that "[t]o the extent that
the media shapes the sentiment of the public, it can strip the
defendant of a fair trial."' This was such a case; therefore,
the defendant did not receive a fair trial.8
The Court would ultimately decide the case on Sixth
Amendment grounds. The author believes that, at this point in
history, the Court was extending protections to the press in
other areas' and did not want to set explicit limits in this
particular one. The irony is that the decision would be based
on the Court's critique of the media and First Amendment
considerations. Placing limits on press coverage of criminal
proceedings would have established a more coherent and work-
able set of rules.
The Court addressed very similar circumstances in
Sheppard v. Maxwell.' Dr. Samuel Sheppard was accused of
murdering his wife in their lakefront home. The publicity that
surrounded the case from the time of the crime through the
end of the trial is too numerous to recount here. Suffice it to
pictures are being taken, instead of the questions counsel are presenting to them.
Additionally, witnesses could alter their testimony to either support or refute prior
testimony of other witnesses whom they have learned of through the press.
Third, the press gives judges extra responsibilities. A judge's primary respon-
sibility is to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial Television, in particu-
lar, must be supervised throughout the entire proceeding, and the mere awareness
of television diverts the judge from the task at hand. Furthermore, there is an
additional diversion for elected judges who must worry that their conduct at trial
could be used as a political weapon.
Finally, the Court noted that the press has an oppressive effect on the defen-
dant. The defendant receives coverage when there is a particularly notorious
crime. With the lens of the media spreading the image of the defendant, he or she
becomes instantly isolated and nefarious. Every reaction to testimony or facial
expression the defendant makes would be dissected by the media. The defendant
is stripped of his dignity and distracted from the proceedings before him. Id. at
546-49.
"' Id. at 542 (noting that the showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite
of reversal).
Id. at 550.
Si Estes, 381 U.S. at 552. See also Patterson v. Colorado, =x reL Attorney Gen-
eral of the State of Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Justice Holmes stating
that our system is premised upon the fact that conclusions of guilt or innocence
are to be decided solely by the evidence and argument presented in open court).
For example, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
384 U.S. 333 (1966). This case was followed by the Second circuit in United
States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404 (2d Cir. 1993) and in United States v. Simon, 664
F. Supp. 780, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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say that the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge
allowed the press to create a "carnival atmosphere."" The
excesses of the press were on display, not only doing the things
that Justice Clark in Estes' suggested could prejudice a jury,
but devising new ways as well. Sheppard's attorney repeatedly
asked for a continuance, a change of venue and declaration of
mistrial because of the press coverage of the case. All were
denied by the trial judge and the defendant was convicted of
murder.
Although, as in Estes, the case was decided under a Sixth
Amendment rationale, the Court used it as an opportunity to
place indirect restraints86 on the press by placing an affirma-
tive duty on the trial judge to ensure that the defendant re-
ceived a fair trial." The Court stated that it had tried to give
the press as much freedom as possible, but it was concerned
with the atmosphere of the trial." Therefore, it again af-
firmed the principle that the press' freedom was bound by the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 9
Whereas in Estes and Sheppard the media permeated the
courtroom, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,0 the
press was completely excluded. The defendant was arrested
and arraigned the morning after six members of the Kellie
family were killed in their home. 1 By this time the case had
already attracted massive amounts of media coverage." Three
days after the crime, the trial court entered a restrictive order
preventing dissemination of information concerning the case at
the request of both the county attorney and the defense.93 Af-
Id. at 358.
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
384 U.S. at 350 (refusing to place direct restraints on the news media).
Id. at 363. It did this by enumerating various actions a judge could take to
both limit the press' coverage and control the ability of the parties involved to try
the case in the press. Id. at 357-62.
" Id. at 354-55.
89 Id. at 350-51.
® 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
91 Id. at 542.
Id. (noting that local, regional and national newspapers, as well as, radio
and television stations were covering the crime).
93 Id. "[No attorney for members of the press appeared at this stage." Id. A
preliminary hearing was held the same day, open to the public but subject to the
order, and the defendant was bound over for trial in the state district court. Id. at
543.
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ter several procedural steps,' the Nebraska Supreme Court
approved an order prohibiting the reporting of, among other
things, the existence and nature of any confessions or admis-
sions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers, al-
though the defendant's confession had been introduced in open
court during his arraignment. 5 The defendant was convicted
of the murders and sentenced to death."
Here, the Court began its struggle of combining First and
Sixth Amendment rationales into a unified theory of access to
criminal proceedings. It began by stating that there are no
explicit or collateral writings to show that the Framers ad-
dressed the conflict between freedom of the press and the right
to an unbiased jury. Nevertheless, the extent of the Court's
Sixth Amendment analysis was a survey of cases involving
pervasive pretrial publicity. It concluded that even the most
prevalent and hostile publicity did not automatically lead to an
unfair trial.9 8
Having reached this conclusion, the Court chose to focus
its analysis on First Amendment rights. Nebraska Press was
tailor made for this approach because there was information
already placed into the public domain at the defendant's ar-
raignment,99 and First Amendment rights have traditionally
been afforded special protection from prior restraint.1 How-
ever, this was a case of first impression for the Court with
regard to protective orders issued to ensure a defendant's right
to a fair trial.
Id. at 542. The county court entered an order prohibiting everyone in atten-
dance from disseminating testimony given or evidence adduced and requiring that
the press observe the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. Thereafter, members of the
press moved for leave to intervene at the district court, asldng that the restrictive
order imposed by the county court be vacated. Id. at 543. The district judge grant-
ed petitioners' motion to intervene and entered his own restrictive order. Id.
"Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 547. However, the Court did note that there is ample evidence that
the Framers were aware that an unrestricted press posed risls to private rights.
Id. Furthermore, it noted that modem communications technology aggravated the
problem by creating a national media more beholden to faraway editors than local
rules and customs. Id. at 547-50.
Id. at 551-54.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
*" Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 556.
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The Court recognized that First Amendment rights to
freedom of the press are not absolute,' but that any prior
restraint will be presumptively unconstitutional.' 2 The Court
held that prior restraint causes instant and irreversible dam-
age, which is particularly great when it affects the communica-
tion of current events.'3 However, the Court, reaffirming its
position in prior cases, stated that these special protections
carry with them additional duties to exercise some effort to
protect the rights of a defendant to a fair trial with an unbi-
ased jury.' Moreover, the Court recognized that some news
and most commentary can be delayed with little harm, but
when these delays are not self-imposed editorial decisions, but
instead are proscribed by the government, the specter of cen-
sorship arises.' 5 As a result, the Court held that this order,
as it related to information already made public at the open
preliminary hearing, was unconstitutional.'
Implicitly, the result of the case was to inject into the
debate a right of access based on the First Amendment. How-
ever, it would take a few more terms before the Court would
directly address this issue. Further, Nebraska Press seemed to
invite trial judges to experiment with new ways to control the
publicity surrounding a trial. One such method was to close
courtrooms to the press and public.0 7 This method did not in-
volve direct prior restraint and found authority in Sheppard's
instruction to judges to take affirmative acts to insure a fair
trial.0 8
101 Id. at 557.
'02 Id. at 556-58.
13 Id. at 559. See also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1975);
see, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
o Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 560.
1 Id. at 560-61. See also Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
259 (1974) (White, J., concurring); see, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Court felt that the government should
look to measures that it had approved in Sheppard v. Maxwell to blunt the effect
of prior restraint. Moreover, the Court expressed the view that most, if not all,
restrictive orders are difficult to draft and, probably ineffective.
o Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 568.
o Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liber-
ties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
7-8, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (No. 77-1301).
1 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
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One such closure case asked the question of whether the
public has a right to compel access to the court in order to
make the information public, over the objection of both the
defendant and the prosecuting attorney. In Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale,0 9 two men and a woman were arrested in con-
nection with the disappedrance of Wayne Clapp. The petition-
ers, who published two newspapers in upstate New York, pro-
vided extensive coverage of the events surrounding the tri-
al." The articles at issue stated that one of the defendants
had led Michigan police to the supposed murder weapon, and
that ammunition for the weapon was found in the motel room
that two of the defendants occupied."' At their preliminary
hearing, the defendants sought to suppress statements made to
the police and the physical evidence seized as a result of the
allegedly involuntary statements." In addition, the defense
attorneys requested, and the district attorney did not oppose,
that the public and press be excluded from the hearing because
the pretrial publicity jeopardized the defendants' right to a fair
trial."' Finding that there was a "reasonable probability" of
prejudice to the defendants, the judge granted the defense's
motion."4
The Court began its analysis of the case by affirming the
notion that pretrial publicity could jeopardize a defendant's
right to a fair trial, and its command from Sheppard that a
trial judge has an affirmative obligation to take protective
measures to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publici-
ty, even when they do not appear necessary." The Court
noted the special purpose of suppression hearings, which is to
1"9 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The Second Circuit did not apply this ruling until
Ayala v. Speckard, 89 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996).
I" Id. at 371-74. These stories cover the dates of July 20 through August 6,
1976 and detailed the victim's disappearance, events leading to, and surrounding,
the defendants subsequent arrest in Mlichigan and extradition back to New York,
background stories about the victim and the defendants, as well as the details of
the defendants' arraignment. Id. at 371-74.
.. Id. at 373.
Id. at 374-75.
113 Id. at 375.
11 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 376. During the time of the petitioners' appeal, the
defendants plead guilty to lesser-included offenses and the transcript of the sup-
pression hearing was released immediately thereafter. Id. at 376 n.4.
" Id. at 378. See, eg., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1965); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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eliminate unreliable or illegally obtained evidence so that po-
tential jurors do not become aware of evidence that is wholly
inadmissible at trial."'
In its Sixth Amendment analysis, the Court noted that the
rights enumerated therein, although not absolute, are personal
to the accused." 7 The Court recognized that nowhere in the
Constitution is there a right of access to criminal trials granted
to the public"' or a right of the public to demand a public tri-
al."' This challenges the notion that the interests of the de-
fendant and the public to a public trial are the same.
The Court then undertook a historical analysis similar to
the one it had engaged in approximately forty years earlier in
In re Oliver. This time the Court reached a different con-
clusion. It stated that history fails to show that the Framers
intended to create a constitutional right of access to pretrial
hearings; all that was intended was to grant the defendant the
right to demand a public trial." And, even if the Sixth
Amendment contained a common law right to attend criminal
trials, there is no evidence that this right need be extended to
pretrial proceedings.'22 For the above reasons, the Court held
that the public, or the press in its stead, had no right to attend
criminal trials.'
Finally, while the Court explicitly reserved the question of
whether there was a First Amendment right of access, it did
116 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 378.
117 Id. at 379-80. See also Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948); Estes, 381
U.S. at 538-39 (Harlan, C.J., concurring). For instance, the Court noted that the
defendant does not have the right to insist on a private trial, Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965), and the public has interests in the guarantees
extended to the defendant. Estes, 381 U.S. at 583 (Warren, C.J., concurring); Bark-
er v. wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312
(1930); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 382-83. However, the public must rely on the litigants
to protect its interests in our adversary system. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383.
... Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379.
119 Id. at 381.
120 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
1 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 385-86.
o2 Id. at 387-88. In fact, the court's historical analysis produced abundant proof
to the contrary. Under English common-law, the public had no right of access to
pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75 (6th
ed. 1967). Similarly the press had no privilege to report information about pretrial
judicial proceedings under English common-law. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 389 n.20.
in Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391.
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address this issue briefly. The Court concluded that even if a
right existed, the trial court took it into account in its ruling
when it concluded that there would be a "reasonable proba-
bility" of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial.m
Second, the Court distinguished this case from Nebraska Press
by noting that in Nebraska Press there was an absolute prohi-
bition of publication, whereas in this case any denial of access
was temporary.'
The specific answer to the First Amendment issue came
one year later in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia."
The defendant was on trial for murder for the fourth time.'
The presiding judge granted the defense counsel's request that
the trial be closed for the sole reason that the public's presence
might distract the jury.' For unknown reasons, the trial
court struck the state's evidence and declared the defendant
not guilty.' As soon as the trial was concluded, tapes of the
proceedings were made available to the public."
The 7-1 decision generated seven opinions, none command-
ing a majority. The two most influential opinions were written
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan. Chief Justice
Burger recast the legal issue as to whether a criminal trial
may be closed to the public upon an unopposed request by the
defendant, without a finding as to whether the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was in jeopardy, or
whether some other overriding interest was at stake.3 '
' Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 393 n.25. Once the danger of prejudice subsided, the trial court re-
leased the transcript and the press could fulfil its function of reporting the infor-
mation. Id- at 393
448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Carpenter, 526 F. Supp.
292 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
127 Id. at 559. His initial trial ended in a conviction which had been reversed
on appeal because of improperly admitted evidence. The second trial ended in a
mistrial when a juror asked to be excused and there was no alternate available.
The third trial also ended in a mistrial because a prospective juror had read
about the previous trials and had told other prospective jurors about the case. Id.
'2 Id. at 559-61.
'2 Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562' n.3. The Virginia Supreme Court denied all of Richmond
Newspapers' petitions for mandamus, prohibition, and leave to appeal. Id. at 562.
" Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564.
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The Court's historical analysis stressed that criminal trials
have traditionally been open to the public and that this tradi-
tion was well established at the time the First Amendment
was adopted.'32 Chief Justice Burger listed several functions
that open trials could serve and concluded that these guaran-
tees would be rendered meaningless if there was no right to
observe criminal trials. Chief Justice Burger next wrote
that the First Amendment principle of freedom of assembly
supports the recognition of an access claim to criminal tri-
als. 34 Therefore, although no right of access to criminal trials
is explicitly granted by the First Amendment, these factors
justified finding such a right implicit in that amendment. 3 1
As a result, absent an overriding interest specifically articulat-
ed in their findings, trial judges would be required to seek
alternatives to satisfy the constitutional demands of fair-
ness.1
36
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and concur-
ring in the judgment, characterized the issue as to whether the
First Amendment, standing alone, guaranteed the right of
access to trial proceedings over the objections of the trial judge
and the parties. 37 In his view, the right of access stems from
the fact that criminal proceedings have been traditionally open
and, more importantly, this right coincides with the structural
role the First Amendment plays in our system of gover-
nance. 38 According to this structural model, the purpose of
the First Amendment is not to protect expression for its own
132 Id. at 566-69.
1 Id. at 575-77. Open trials provide assurance that proceedings are being con-
ducted fairly; create public confidence in the outcomes; have an educative effect;
discourage perjury and the misconduct of participants and decisions based on bias
and partiality, as well as offer therapeutic value to the community. Id. at 569-73.
Chief Justice Burger stressed the importance of protecting the public's First
Amendment interest in the right to discuss the criminal justice system, which
includes both the right to speak about trials and the right to receive this informa-
tion. Id. at 575-77.
13 Id. at 578. Burger felt that the right to assemble in places traditionally open
to the public has long been viewed as enhancing both the First Amendment free-
dom of expression and the integrity and quality of the proceedings. Id. at 577-78.
13 Id. at 577, 579-80.
1 Id. at 580-81. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65
(1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 357-62.
1 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584-85.
... For an elucidation of the latter theory, see Justice William Brennan, Ad.
dress, 32 RUTGERs L. REV. 173, 176-82 (1979).
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sake; rather, the amendment aims to further our democratic
system by assuring that the public has the information it
needs to discuss the operations of government.' As such, the
right of access acts as an additional check on the criminal
justice system."
This was, as Justice Stevens would remark, "a watershed
case."' In fact, since Gannett the Court has not upheld any
closure order. The Court would have been better off relying on
the Nebraska Press decision by reasoning that, because this
was the defendant's fourth trial, much of the evidence was
already in the public domain. Therefore, closure of the proceed-
ings amounted to prior restraint of publishing facts already in
the press' possession. However, because Richmond Newspapers
decided that the First Amendment created a qualified right of
access for the press to criminal proceedings, it is important to
note the faults in the logic which form its foundation.
The Court's conclusions, based on its historical review, are
suspect. The Court failed to note that at the time the Bill of
Rights was drafted, the practice was to record cases that re-
flected exceptions, not rules. Further, its reliance on history
fails to take into account the enormous changes that have
occurred in criminal procedure law since the writing of the Bill
of Rights.' It has been the wisdom of both Congress and the
courts to supplant the historical reliance on openness to ensure
a fair trial by placing in the hands of defense counsel procedur-
al tools to guarantee fairness.
Most criminal cases go from indictment to plea. There is
usually no pretrial hearing, let alone a trial. Despite the deci-
sion in Richmond Newspapers, the workings of the system still
happen behind closed doors, either at the charging stage or
during plea negotiations. Yet, nowhere in Richmond Newspa-
pers, or any of its progeny does the Supreme Court suggest we
allow access to the prosecutor's office. Nor does it comment on
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 592, 596. It allows the public to see that the defendant gets a fair
and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence and aids in the fact-finding process,
while satisfying the appearance that justice is being done. Id. at 593-97.
"' Id. at 582.
See, e.g., People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 313 N.E.2d 49, 359 N.YS.2d 582
(1974); People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1974);
People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1972).
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the prejudicial effect of allowing the press to report the condi-
tions under which the defendant would plead guilty.
Moreover, the Court's development of a structural role for
the First Amendment fails for two reasons. First, this function-
al role for the First Amendment is "theoretically endless," as
Justice Brennan himself points out.4 3 What subject in the
realm of public debate could not be better informed by increas-
ing the flow of information? Although Justice Brennan recom-
mends that the protection be invoked with "temperance," 14
the strict scrutiny standard the Court uses to test this new
presumption sets a hurdle so high that it has effectively dis-
couraged to a nullity any opportunity for restraint.
Second, the creations of this structural model turn the
First Amendment from a shield into a sword. Until Richmond
Newspapers, the First Amendment allowed a willing recipient
to obtain information from a willing speaker. 4 ' The claim
that the precommunicative process of gathering information
was protected by the First Amendment was rejected by the Su-
preme Court three times in the 1970s' and was echoed by
Justice Stewart in Gannett.47 However, by finding a public
right of access guaranteed by the First Amendment, the Su-
preme Court abandoned earlier doctrine based on speech-based
limitations. As a result, the Court gave the First Amendment a
sharp edge to use in gaining access to other stages of criminal
proceedings.
Upon this faulty reasoning and weak legal foundation, the
Court moved forward. In Globe Newspapers v. Superior
Court,4 ' the Court firmly entrenched a strict scrutiny stan-
dard: access to criminal trials may be denied only if the denial
is necessitated by a compelling government interest that is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 4 ' Globe involved a
" Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (citing Brennan, Address, 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 177 (1979)).
"Id.
14 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
' See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417
U.S. 843 (1974).
147 See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379.
14 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
1 Id. at 606-07.
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Massachusetts statute that contained a provision mandating
the exclusion of the press and public from the courtroom dur-
ing the testimony of any minor who is allegedly the victim of a
sexual offense." The defendant objected to the closure and
the prosecution noted for the record that the closure order was
not issued at its request.15' The case proceeded to trial,
where the defendant was acquitted. 2
The Supreme Court closely adhered to the reasoning of
Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers; that historical
evidence of openness and the functional role the press plays in
criminal proceedings creates a presumption of openness.' In
addressing the state's reasons for requesting closure, the Court
held that its interest in preventing further trauma and embar-
rassment to the victim was in fact compelling.' However, in
the Court's opinion, the mandatory closure provision was too
broad, preferring instead to have trial judges approach the
issue on a case-by-case basis.' The Court found that the
state's second interest, to encourage victims of sexual assaults
to come forward to provide testimony, was speculative.'
Moreover, the Court noted that the press was not barred from
obtaining an account of the victim's testimony from other
sources.
5 7
Reliance on the First Amendment interpretation was not
necessary to arrive at the Court's desired result. Since the
defendant objected to closure, there was a basis for invoking
his Sixth Amendment rights, which the Court had previously
outlined in Gannett. Perhaps it decided as it did because it
wanted to move away from its reliance on history. In fact, the
Court completely disregarded the traditional practice of closing
courtrooms during the testimony of minor rape victims."
The Court's holding both cemented in place the First Amend-
" Id. at 598. The mandatory closure provisions in this case were sui generis in
the United States. Id. at 608 n.22.
... Id. at 599. The Globe Newspaper Company was denied access to both the
preliminary hearings and the trial. Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 600.
Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 605-06.
4 Id. at 607.
I Id. at 607-09.
Id. at 609-10.
157 Id. at 610.
158 Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. at 612-13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ment "presumption of openness"'69 it had espoused in Rich-
mond Newspapers, while resting its "right of access" jurispru-
dence on the new structural prong created therein.
The Court relied on this First Amendment rationale again
in the case of a voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. In
Press Enterprise 1,160 the Court created an even more strin-
gent standard for overcoming the presumption of openness
than it had in Globe. In this case the defendant was tried and
convicted for the rape and murder of a teenage girl.16 Press
Enterprise moved for the voir dire to be open to the public and
the press, asserting an absolute right to attend the trial and
that the trial commenced with the selection of the jury.'62
The state objected, on the grounds that the press' presence
would prevent it from getting candid responses from the pro-
spective members of the jury." The judge closed the voir
dire proceedings to the public in order to protect the juror's
right of privacy." Thereafter, the trial court continually re-
fused to release the transcripts of the voir dire, even after the
trial was over.
65
Once again, the Court began with a historical review and
noted that jury selection has been traditionally open to the
public and, therefore, it was presumptively an open proceed-
ing.6  The Court noted that closure should be rare. 67 It
held that the presumption of openness may be overcome only
where: (1) there is an overriding interest that may be preju-
diced; (2) the closure is not broader than necessary to protect
that interest; (3) the trial court has examined possible alter-
natives to closure; and (4) the court makes specific findings to
facilitate appellate review. 68 The Court found that, even
... Id. at 610. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
573 (1980)).
16 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
... Id. at 503.
162 Id.
163 Id.
16 Id. at 503-05. The voir dire process lasted six weeks, with roughly three
days open to the public. Id. at 503.
13 Press Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 503-04.
16 Id. at 505-08. The openness reassured those not attending trials that others
were able to observe the proceedings and ensure that justice was being dispensed
fairly and would contribute to the overall fairness of the process itself. Id.
167 Id. at 509.
163 Id. at 510.
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though the right of an accused to fairness in the jury selection
process was a compelling interest, the trial court lacked suffi-
cient findings to order protracted closure." Moreover, the
trial judge did not consider alternative methods to protect the
privacy of the jurors in this case. Without the consideration of
alternatives, the closure of the voir dire was unconstitution-
al. 17 0
Press Enterprise I rang the death knell of right of access
jurisprudence based on Sixth Amendment principles. The
Court seemed to desert the principle that Sixth Amendment
rights belonged to the accused. It implicitly found that there is
no right higher than the right to a fair trial."'
However, the Court would later return to the Sixth
Amendment and the issue it faced in Gannett in the case of
Waller v. Georgia.17 As a result of wiretaps on several
phones, thirty-five defendants were indicted and charged with
violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nization Act ("RICO"), engaging in commercial gambling, and
communicating gambling information. 3 The petitioners and
thirteen other defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps as
well as other evidence seized during searches. 4 The state
moved to close the suppression hearing because publication of
the wiretap evidence would cause the evidence to be inadmissi-
ble and the content of the tapes involved some persons who
were indicted but were not on trial, and other persons who
were not yet indicted.' Over the defendants' objection, the
trial judge ordered the suppression hearing closed to all per-
sons except witnesses, court personnel, the parties and the
lawyers. 76 The case was tried in open court and the petition-
16 Id. at 510-11.
170 Press Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511.
171 Id. at 508.
172 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
172 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 41-42.
176 Id. at 42. The suppression hearing lasted seven days, but le3s than two and
one half hours were dedicated to playing the wiretap recordings; the rest was
dedicated to other evidence. As a result of the hearing, approximately ten boxes of
evidence were suppressed and an equal amount were not. Prior to the trial of the
remaining persons named in the indictment, the transcript of the suppression
hearing was released. Id. at 42-43.
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ers were found guilty of commercial gambling and communicat-
ing gambling information, but acquitted of the RICO charg-
es.
177
The Court began by eliminating any difference between its
prior First Amendment and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
It announced that the Sixth Amendment standard for access to
suppression hearings was the same as the First Amendment
right it had developed in the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases. 17' The Court noted that the principal aim of a criminal
proceeding is to see that the accused is treated fairly.' Fur-
thermore, the public trial guarantee was created for the benefit
of the accused. 8 ' The Court subsequently reviewed the na-
ture of suppression hearings, this time reaching an opposite
conclusion to those it had reached in Gannett.'' It stated
that closure objections of the defendant must satisfy the stan-
dard it had previously established in Press Enterprise .8.
Applying that standard to this case, the Court held that
the closure of the entire suppression hearing was unjusti-
fied." The Court recognized that the interests advanced by
the prosecutor could be compelling. However, the state's proffer
was not sufficiently precise as to whose rights would be in-
fringed upon, what part of the tapes might infringe upon them,
and what percentage of the evidence consisted of the tapes'1
Therefore, the trial court's conclusions were unnecessarily
broad and did not warrant closing the entire hearing." Fur-
thermore, the trial court did not comply with the third prong of
177 Waller, 467 U.S. at 43.
17 Id. at 45-46.
'79 Id. at 46.
11 Id. (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)).
181 Id. at 46-47. The Court noted that suppression hearings are often as impor-
tant as trials themselves. A defendant would often reach a plea agreement after
the suppression hearing, therefore, the suppression hearing was often the only
"trial" he would receive. Moreover, the Court pointed out that suppression hearings
resemble trials in the way they are conducted. The Court concluded that the fea-
ture of openness might be particularly important for suppression hearings, because
often the methods for obtaining evidence as well as prosecutor and police conduct
were challenged. Therefore, the public has an interest in unmasking these allega-
tions. Id.
1"2 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47.
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the test, because it did not consider reasonable alternatives to
closure."i As a result, the Court reversed the decision and
remanded with instructions."
The right to a fair trial and an impartial jury is contained
in the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, Sixth Amendment
rights are personal to the accused. In this case, whose Sixth
Amendment rights were at stake? Certainly the defendants
invoked theirs by objecting to closure. Yet, what about the
defendants in the subsequent trial? The state certainly had the
other defendants in mind when it requested closure, as evi-
denced by the reasons it gave for its request. The author does
not know if the Court could have determined that issue in this
case, because the other defendants were not represented, and
the issue might have been moot since any prejudice that could
have accrued towards them probably occurred when the tran-
scripts of the hearing were released before the other defen-
dants stood trial. However, the Court did not address the is-
sue. This demonstrates how its focus has moved away from fair
trials to expanding the right of access at any cost.
The Court's characterization of the value of openness in
suppression hearings is perplexing. In this case, the jury could
have been exposed to ten boxes worth of evidence. Is the
public's interest in uncovering improprieties by the prosecutor
and police worth the risk that the jury would be prejudiced?
Probably not, if one considers that the public would have the
same opportunity to uncover these acts as long as the tran-
script was released at some later date. Moreover, the Court's
determination that the trial court did not consider alternatives
short of closure is speculative. The fact that the trial court
released the transcripts of the hearing after the current trial
suggests that it had, and determined that this was the best
alternative.
The Court's assessment of the prosecutor's proffer at the
closure hearing is equally questionable. As previously indicat-
ed, the prosecutor clearly had the other trials in mind when he
attempted to close the hearing. However, if he had released the
information sought by the Supreme Court he would have had
to release the names of the other defendants whose conversa-
I !d.
18 Waller, 467 U.S. at 50.
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tions were contained in the tapes. Yet, the Court did not think
to inquire into the effect of the defendants' names being associ-
ated with the current trial. Significantly, the Court recognized
that suppression hearings may be as important or even more
important than trials themselves. Therefore, the Sixth Amend-
ment rights of the accused apply to all phases of the case
where witnesses may testify and be cross-examined.
Yet, these cases do not address whether prosecution is
entitled to closure of a courtroom for other aspects of the pro-
ceedings. For example, should the courtroom be closed or
should there be a side-bar outside the hearing of the public
where the prosecution makes its proffer as to why the hearing
or trial should be closed? Should the record that is made be
placed under seal or be available to the public at a later time?
Should the defendant be permitted to participate in or hear the
application? Should the court impose a gag order that would
preclude the defendant and defense counsel from leaking or
discussing the proffer with the public or the media? Should the
court bar defense counsel from discussing the proffer with
his/her client?
Rule 43(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure require the defendant's presence at every stage of a crimi-
nal case. The right. of a defendant to be present for "every
stage of his trial is guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment and is binding on the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment." 8 ' Rule 43 has codified the
defendant's common law and constitutional rights to be present
throughout a trial.'89 Therefore, any encroachment on those
rights may include a closure of the courtroom, in whole or in
part. Is the right of confrontation obliterated only when the
public and the defendant cannot see the witness? Or, does the
right apply only to what may be heard from testimony. Is the
right of confrontation or the public's right of access implicated
when the identity of a witness is concealed?
The Court returned to the First Amendment and applied
its previously enunciated standards in Press Enterprise II.' °
' See 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 721 (2d ed. 1982).
... See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975).
478 U.S. 1, 2 (1986).
[Vol. 63:501
CLOSING TE COURTROOM TO THE PUBLIC
The defendant, Robert Diaz, was charged with twelve counts of
murder for allegedly injecting patients with the heart drug
lidocaine while he was a nurse."9 The defendant moved to
exclude the public from the preliminary hearing based on a
California statute which presumes openness, but allows closure
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.' The magis-
trate granted the unopposed motion, finding that there was a
threat to the defendant's rights because the case had attracted
national attention. 3 The preliminary hearing lasted forty-
one days." The defendant did not offer any evidence but his
counsel cross-examined the witnesses."3 After the hearing
had ended, Press Enterprise sought the release of the
transcript.' The magistrate denied the request and sealed
the record of the hearing.'
The state moved in Superior Court to have the transcript
released to the public and Press Enterprise later joined in
support of the motion.9" The defendant opposed the motion
on the grounds that release of the transcript would cause prej-
udicial pretrial publicity.' The Superior Court held that
there was a reasonable likelihood of prejudice that would deny
the defendant a fair trial."' At approximately the same time,
the defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the Superior
Court released the transcript.2"' The California Supreme
Court concluded that there was no general right of access to
preliminary hearings because Press Enterprise I and Globe
applied only to trials.2 Furthermore, in those cases, the rea-
sons for requesting closure were different from the defendant's
assertion of his fair trial rights.0"
19 Id. at 3.
1 2 Id. at 3-4.
19 Id. at 4.
19 I& The testimony at the hearing was mostly medical and scientific, the
remainder consisting of the testimony of co-workers who had worked the shifts
with Diaz when the patients died. Id.
" Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 4.
" Id. at 4-5.
" I& at 5.
19 Id.
12Id.






The Supreme Court started with the structural assessment
it had previously made in Richmond Newspapers and its proge-
ny; a defendant has a right to a fair trial and an important
way to assure that right is to allow the proceedings to be open
to the public.2°4 Next, the Court stated that it would move
forward on First Amendment grounds because, although this
was not in fact a trial, a determination of the rights of the
parties involved in the proceeding did not depend on how the
proceeding itself was labeled." 5 It concluded that the meth-
ods used to conduct preliminary hearings in California were so
similar to trials that openness would further several goals."0 6
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the qualified
First Amendment right to access applied, and could only be
overcome by passing the standard established in Press Enter-
prise L2°7
The Court found that the California Supreme Court did
not apply the proper test for the first prong of the Press Enter-
prise I standard.0 8 It found that by requiring only a reason-
able likelihood of prejudice, the California court placed a lower
burden on the defendant than is called for under the First
Amendment's substantial probability test.0 9 After observing
that pretrial publicity could create the risk of an unfair trial,
the Court concluded that the risk did not warrant automatic
closure.210 Reiterating the mandate in Sheppard, the Court
suggested other alternatives that the trial court could have
used, short of closure.21' Furthermore, even if it justified clo-
sure, closing the entire forty-one day hearing was not narrowly
214 Id. at 7.
20 Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7.
20" Id. at 12-13. The Court defined those goals as: (1) since the preliminary
hearing was often the only hearing, it would be the only opportunity for public
surveillance; (2) the lack of a jury at preliminary hearings made public access all
the more crucial because of the role the public plays in guarding against miscon-
duct by the prosecutor and judge; and (3) denying the public the transcript of the
hearing frustrates the "therapeutic value" of openness. Id.
207 Id. at 13-14.
205 Id. at 14.
20 Id.
210 Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14-15.
211 Id.
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tailored to serve that interest." Accordingly, the Court re-
versed the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
In discussing the possibility of a Sixth Amendment right of
the public to attend a suppression hearing, the Gannett majori-
ty concluded that, at common law, there is no evidence that
the public has any right to attend pretrial proceedings. In fact,
it found substantial evidence to the contrary. However, here,
the Court looked more to the common practice of open prelim-
inary hearings, and then fabricated the existence of some spe-
cifically recognized legal right of access.
Moreover, the Court failed to acknowledge the purpose of
the preliminary hearing at issue: to determine reasonable
cause, not guilt. However, the Court also failed to address the
consequences of forty-one days of press coverage followed by
the defendant being held for trial. Could the public, unschooled
in the legal differences between probable cause and guilt, have
confused the magistrate's decision to hold the defendant over
for trial based on probable cause with a determination of guilt?
Ill. THE LOWER COURTS
Lower courts have interpreted this muddled right of access
doctrine broadly. Based on Richmond Newspapers and its prog-
eny, these courts have extended the right of access to: suppres-
sion hearings, 4  bail hearings, 2 1  sentencing hearings,
2 16
change of venue hearings,21 7 plea hearings,218  contempt
hearings,219 pretrial ex parte recusal hearings,.. post con-
viction proceedings,2 2 1 parole revocation proceedings,= pa-
212 Id. at 15.
213 Id.
211 In re Application of Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1982).
21 United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 361-65 (5th Cir. 1983).
211 United States v. Byrd, 20 Media L. Rep. 1804 (D.S.C. 1992).
217 Charlotte Observer v. Baliker, 882 F.2d 850, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1989).
2" In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1986).
21" In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1983).
Storer Communications v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1987).
CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985).




role release hearings,223  executions,2 24  bench con-ferences,225 chambers conferences,226  juvenile proceed-
ings,"' court marials,22  civil case proceedings," ' prelimi-
nary injunction proceedings,' 0  and closure proceedings.2 31
Instead of exercising the restraint Justice Brennan called for
in Richmond, courts have thrown the courtroom doors wide
open. However, as the following analysis of New York law and
the opinions of the Second Circuit will demonstrate, this has
not always led to consistent application.
A. The Second Circuit
In Herald Co. v. Klepfer,"2 the charges against the defen-
dant arose from a Federal Bureau of Investigation background
check of Raymond J. Donovan, President Reagan's nominee for
Secretary of Labor. 3 The defendant filed several motions to
suppress oral statements made to federal investigators. The
motions were heard in open court and denied. Subsequently,
defendant was granted permission to file supplemental sup-
pression motions. 4 The new motions, filed under seal, re-
newed the motions to suppress and contained a motion to ex-
clude the public from the suppression hearing. The government
opposed the motion for closure, because it felt all information
contained therein had already been made public at the prior
hearing." The district court judge granted the defendant's
request for closure, citing Gannett and stating that the poten-
tial for harm outweighed the right of the public to attend the
heariig."6
Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983).
2' KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 11 Media L. Rep. 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d. 708 (11th Cir. 1993).
= CNN v. United States, 824 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In re Chase, 112 Misc. 2d 436, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1982).
United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433 (C.MA. 1985).
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
" Stanley Works v. Newell Co., 21 Media L. Rep. 1120 (D. Conn 1993).
2" Storer Communications v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1987).
734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
The defendant was charged with having made false statements concerning
Donovan to the FBI and a special prosecutor. Id. at 95.
2U Id.
' Id. At this time, the Herald Company joined the government in opposing the
motion to close the proceedings. Id.
" Id. at 95-96. The hearing, lasting four days, was conducted in a closed court-
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The Second Circuit began by distinguishing this case from
Nebraska Press Association,27 and casting the issue in the
more general terms of whether the public and press had a
First Amendment right to attend suppression hearings.' Af-
ter a detailed review of Press Enterprise I, Globe, Richmond
Newspapers and Gannett, the court noted the Supreme Court's
shift from a historical to a structural argument which strongly
suggests that there is a First Amendment right of access to
pretrial proceedings. 9
The court decided that closure of a suppression hearing
could be overcome upon a showing of significant risk of preju-
dice to the defendant's fair trial rights; and that closure should
be tailored as narrowly as possible to prevent those risks."'
Stating that closure does not need to be the least restrictive
means possible to protect the defendant's rights, the Second
Circuit went on to note that the trial judge had an affirmative
duty to consider alternatives." Moreover, the court is re-
quired to give some form of notice so that the parties seeking
access have an opportunity to express their objections to clo-
sure.=
The next time the Second Circuit addressed closure within
the context of a suppression hearing was in New York Times
Co. v. Biaggi.' The defendants filed sealed motions to sup-
press and the trial judge granted the motions and ordered that
the motion papers be kept under seal.2' The court began by
recognizing that the public had a qualified First Amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings; it then extended this
qualified right to the suppression hearing. 5 However, it not-
ed that the blanket closure order was not narrowly drawn to
room. Id at 95.
1 The court did this by noting that this case did not concern the ability of the
trial court to prevent publication information already in its posession. Herald, 734
F.2d at 95.
21 Id. at 97-98.
20 Id. at 100.
241 I&
24 Herald, 734 F.2d at 101.
2- 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987).
24 Id. at 111-13.
21 Id. at 113-14.
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protect the defendant's interests, vacated the order, and re-
manded. 46
The final case where the Second Circuit had an opportuni-
ty to address pretrial hearings was United States v. Cojab.2 47
The petitioner and several other news organizations covered
the investigation, arrest and court proceedings involving the
defendant, who had been implicated in a drug ring murder.2 48
The petitioner complained about a prior pretrial hearing which
was closed to the public and where the transcript had been
sealed.249 The petitioner reasoned that since information con-
tained in the news coverage was public, no further harm could
occur from a disclosure of the same facts contained in the pre-
trial hearing."0 The defendant and the government opposed
the motion, both filing memoranda under sealY1
The Court began its analysis by noting that the press'
right to attend criminal tribunals should not be allowed to
override a defendant's right to receive a fair trial from an im-
partial jury, and that it is within a court's discretion to close a
courtroom and seal the records to protect the defendant's fair
trial rights. 2 Where the defendant and government seek clo-
sure of a trial and the sealing of the records, they must demon-
strate that the press is likely to prejudice the fair trial guaran-
tee and that the closure is narrowly tailored to further those
interestsY Moreover, the trial court's findings supporting
closure must be in sufficient detail for an appellate court re-
viewing the closure order to be able to determine whether it
was properly entered.'
The Second Circuit also addressed the propriety of closing
a criminal trial during a witness' testimony in Woods v.
24 Id. at 114-16.
2,? 996 F.2d 1404 (2d Cir. 1993).
24 Id. at 1406-07.
29 Id. at 1405. As far as the petitioner was aware, there was no public notice
announcing that the government had moved to close the hearing or seal the record
and that no member of the press was given an opportunity to contest the closure.
Id. at 1405-06.
224 Id. at 1406.
251 Id.
222 Cojab, 996 F.2d at 1405.
' Id. at 1407-08.
24 Id. at 1408.
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Kuhlmann." In this case, a witness for the state was to tes-
tify that she observed the defendant Woods inflict violence on
the victim." The prosecutor asked the trial judge to close
the courtroom while the witness was testifying, after the wit-
ness informed the court that a member of the defendant's fami-
ly had approached her and threatened her with physical vio-
lence if she testified.' 7  The trial judge granted the
prosecutor's request and excluded all members of the
defendant's family from the courtroom during the testimo-
ny-.2Z
The court applied the standard developed by the Supreme
Court in Waller regarding the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rightsY9 However, in applying the first prong of the Waller
test, the court adopted the same standard as that in the Ninth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits; closure of the court was permis-
sible on a "substantial reason" basis, rather than on Waller's
"overriding interest" grounds.2'0 The court reasoned that the
standard was justified because the prosecutor was only re-
questing a partial closure not the total closure as that which
occurred in WallerY.2 ' Thereafter, the court determined that
the prosecution had satisfied the "substantial reason" criteria
to exclude members of the defendant's family and concluded
that it satisfied the rest of the Waller test.'
The Second Circuit addressed the same issue in Vidal v.
Williams.2' There, the defendant was charged with selling a
controlled substance and arrested in a buy-and-bust opera-
tion.2 ' As the undercover officer was about to testify, the
prosecution requested that the judge close the courtroom in
order to protect the identity of the undercover officer, because
the officer was still operating in the vicinity where defendant
2 977 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1992).
2W Id.
I Id. at 74-75. Immediately before the witness testified, the trial judge briefly
asked her ff she had any fear for her or her family's safety and the witness re-
sponded that she did. Id. at 75.
25 Id-
29 Id. at 76.
263 Woods, 977 F.2d at 76.
261 Id.
212 Id. at 77-78.
263 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
2" Id. at 68.
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had been arrested.2" The defense counsel requested that the
accused's parents, who were present at the time, be allowed to
remain in the courtroom during the undercover officer's testi-
mony.266 The court granted the prosecution's request and
closed the courtroom.6 7
At issue in this case was the second prong of the Waller
test: whether the exclusion of the defendant's parents was no
broader than necessary in order to protect that interest.6 8
Based on the record, the court determined that in this particu-
lar case such closure was overly broad, and unnecessary to
protect the undercover's identity.2 69 Moreover, the trial court
was unable to meet the third prong of the Waller test because
it gave no consideration to less restrictive alternatives.
Finally, the court again addressed this issue again in
Guzman v. Scully 17 ' During the trial, prior to cross-examina-
tion of a prosecution witness, the state requested that the trial
court exclude four women who were apparently either mem-
bers of the defendant's family or his friends.2 72 Based on a
brief inquiry, the trial court granted the prosecution's request
in order to facilitate the witness's ability to testify without fear
or concern for her safety.2 73
The court began by noting that the trial court had not
specifically asked the witness about the nature of his fear.
Thus, it was unable to evaluate whether it was an "overriding
interest" within the meaning of Waller, or at least a "substan-
tial reason" within the meaning of Woods." The court held
that this violated the defendant's rights to a public trial, be-
cause by relying on the unsubstantiated statements of the
prosecutor rather than conducting an inquiry of its own, the




26 Vidal, 31 F.3d at 69.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 80 F.3d 772 (2d Cir. 1996).
2 Id. at 774. These spectators had not been present in the courtroom the pre-
vious day, when the witness completed his direct testimony. Id. at 774 n.1.
273Id. at 774.
274 Id. at 775.
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reason sufficient to justify closure." Moreover, since the sat-
isfaction of the first prong is questionable, it necessarily fol-
lows that the court was uncertain as to the application of the
other prongs of the Waller test.
With this arsenal of cases in hand, the Second Circuit
decided Ayala v. SpeckardY6 In Ayala, the defendant was
arrested in a buy-and-bust operation in Bronx County, New
York. 7 During the trial, the prosecutor requested that the
courtroom be closed during the testimony of an undercover
police officer who was the principle witness at the trial. Simi-
lar to the concerns presented in Vidal, closure was requested
in order to protect the undercover officer's safety as well as to
ensure the effectiveness of the officer's future undercover oper-
ations.' The state court judge granted the closureY 9
The court began its analysis by noting that the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial is not absolute and that the
Supreme Court had advanced a presumption of openness for
policy reasons."0 Applying the first prong of the Waller test,
the court concluded that the state failed to meet its bur-
den."' The court recognized that the state has an overriding
interest in the safety and anonymity of its undercover offi-
cers. 2 However, the state failed to demonstrate a sufficient
nexus between the officer's testimony and the danger that
testifying in open court would blow his cover.' The court felt
that the mere possibility that he would be discovered did not
overcome the defendant's constitutional right to a public tri-
al.
The court recognized the larger picture. Affirming the
state court's decision would have created a per se rule of clo-
sure, which the Supreme Court had rejected in Globe. This
could not be sanctioned in light of the presumption of openness
275 I&
-6 89 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996).
2' I& at 92.
2U6 Id,.
2" 1& at 93.
2" Id- at 94.
" Ayala, 89 F.3d at 95.
27 Id.
273 Id,
2U Id- at 95-96.
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and the high hurdle erected for closure."' Moreover, the
court demonstrated that closure was possible if the state was
able to show, with specificity, a sufficient nexus between the
officer's testimony and direct threats to his safety.28 In dicta,
the court noted that the trial judge had not considered alterna-
tives to closure during the undercover's testimony even though
the trial court had an affirmative obligation to consider reason-
able alternatives to closure.287
Upon rehearing, 8 the court stated that in its original
opinion it had straightforwardly applied the standard enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court. 9 However, the court would ad-
dress a different interest proffered by the state: an interest in
preserving the capability of law enforcement personnel oper-
ating in an undercover capacity. 20 However, it did not ad-
dress this issue, finding instead that the same conclusion could
be reached based on Waller's directive to the trial court to sua
sponte consider alternatives to closure.29'
The Second Circuit listed five separate reasons for this
contention. First, it looked to the specific language in Waller. It
noted that in Waller the defendant had raised only a general
objection to closure. Therefore, when the Supreme Court raised
the issue of alternatives itself, it meant that the consideration
of alternatives was part of a trial judge's affirmative obliga-
tion.29
2
Second, it articulated that the Supreme Court had adopted
a standard concerning the right of access; that is, since Rich-
mond Newspapers, the Court recognized a qualified First
Amendment right of access, and in Waller, as the author has
noted supra, it applied the same standard to a Sixth Amend-
ment claim. Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that Press
Enterprise II had been reversed in part for the failure of the
trial judge to consider alternatives to closure.2 93
21 Id. at 96.
2' Ayala, 89 F.3d at 96.
287 Id.
28 Ayala v. Speckard, 102 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 1996).
281 Id. at 652.
298 Id.
291 Id.
212 Id. at 653.
29 Ayala, 102 F.3d at 653.
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Third, the Court noted that orders must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve the compelling interests that precipitated clo-
sure.' Implicit in that command was the fact that trial
courts must consider alternatives. Moreover, the Court stated
that it would be "odd" to have the defendant suggest alterna-
tives to closure to preserve his own constitutional right to a
public trial." Fourth, the Court noted that there were many
alternatives that easily could have been employed but were
never considered by the trial court."6 Finally, the Court in-
voked the presumption of openness established by the Supreme
Court. 7 If that presumption was to have any substance, the
trial court must employ all reasonable steps short of closure,
even if it must have raised them sua sponte."3
In its suggested alternatives to full closure, partial closure
of the courtroom was also an apparent compromise. The Ayala
Court noted that trial judges might consider: (1) a strategically
placed chalkboard; or (2) asking defendants whom they wished
to remain in the courtroom; and (3) compelling the prosecution
to show cause why any such persons should not be present;
and (4) the possibility of disguising the witness, including giv-
ing him an altered voice by the use of a technical device capa-
ble of modifying the distinctive qualities of a person's speech.
Naturally, all of this hocus pocus is not without serious
flaws. For example, the very act of asking the defendant who
he or she wants in the courtroom may have a chilling effect on
that defendant, the defense and the friends, family and others
that the defendant may wish to attend. The alternatives sug-
gested by the court in Ayala are in some respects more like a
screen test at central casting. Before long, courtroom observers
will have to submit to questionnaires, fingerprinting and pho-
tographs before they are allowed into the courtroom. In releas-
ing their names and confirming their identities, they may, in
some cases, inculpate themselves or those named. Additionally,
charges such as conspiracy or money laundering, if they are
benefactors of the defendant or otherwise aligned with the case
or being sought in connection with another investigation may
2Id
2 Id. at 654.
' Ayala, 102 F.3d at 654.
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be brought. Will the courtroom observers be compelled to prove
their citizenship and produce dates of birth and social security
numbers? Will the prosecution then perform criminal back-
ground checks on them or otherwise investigate them? Will it
check with the INS regarding possible deportation or Depart-
ment of Immigration detainers? Does this compulsory process
to obtain public access to the courtroom suggest violations of
the First Amendment's Freedom of Association Clause or the
defendant's right to assert the Fifth Amendment? If asked
about whom he would like in the courtroom, can a defendant
stand mute or be compelled to assert the Fifth Amendment? If
he does the latter, may his observers remain in the courtroom?
How should the courtroom be closed? Should the entire
public be excluded? Should the jury and defendant see the
witness's face or should there be a screen instead? If there is a
screen, how does this affect the defendant's right of confronta-
tion? How does this ominous setting impact jurors, especially if
they are not permitted to see the witness's facial features and
body language in response to questions? If a defendant is per-
mitted to see the witness's face, he may be able to sketch it or
describe it. Does his silence reflect consciousness of guilt?
B. New York State
The Court of Appeals of New York has had the opportunity
to address the issue of access to pretrial hearings in its deci-
sion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale"' Gannett dealt with a
pretrial suppression hearing in a highly publicized murder
trial in upstate New York."' Judge Wachtler, writing for the
majority, stressed the presumption of openness in criminal
proceedings. However, he noted that this is not an absolute
right. Although the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment
belong to the defendant, he recognized that the public has
interests in criminal proceedings. 0 ' However, the assumption
that the public has such interests is based on the notion that
those interests will not pose a threat to the integrity of the
trial.0  To that end, a judge, having an affirmative obligation
2- 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
" See id. at 374-75, 372 N.E.2d at 546-47, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
301 Id. at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547-48, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
3- Id. at 377, 3.72 N.E.2d at 548, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 760. See also, Estes v. Texas,
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to ensure a balance of interests, needs the discretionary power
to achieve that balance.03
In a suppression hearing, the trial judge's duty is to see
that inadmissible evidence is not brought to the public eye.'
Moreover, to allow the public to discover this evidence impli-
cates the judge in potentially unconstitutional behavior."'
The trial judge should give the public and press an opportunity
for its interests to be heard. However, the fact that the tran-
scripts were made available in this case satisfied the public's
right to know and the defendant's right to a fair trial."
The Court of Appeals had to consider the right of access to
criminal proceedings in the pretrial context in Westchester
Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggit 0 This case concerned
the rape and sexual assault of several girls and young wom-
en."0 ' The defense counsel requested a preliminary hearing to
determine whether the' defendant was mentally fit to stand
trial."9 Before any testimony was given at this hearing, the
defense counsel requested that the public and press be exclud-
ed throughout the hearing because pretrial reporting of the
defendant's mental condition could prejudice his trial.' The
district attorney did not oppose the defense counsel's
motion,.. and the court granted it."12
After noting the advantages of open proceedings, the Court
of Appeals stated that media exposure does not always ensure
a fair trial.' Pretrial suppression hearings often deal with
evidence that is highly prejudicial and often not admissible;
the court may therefore strike a balance in favor of the ac-
cused. 4 However, mental capacity hearings are not used to
381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947).
" DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d at 378, 372 N.E.2d at 548, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
' Id at 378-79, 372 N.E.2d at 549, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 761. See, e.g., Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966).
" DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
Id- at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550-51, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
'07 48 N.Y.2d 430, 399 N.E.2d 518, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1979).
'o Id- at 435, 399 N.E.2d at 520, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
l
310 Id. Furthermore, if he later chose not to use an insanity defense, potential
jurors may have already learned of the defendants mental problems. Id.
311 Id.
3- Leggit, 48 N.Y.2d at 436, 399 N.E.2d at 521, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
I1 1& at 437-38, 399 N.E.2d at 521-22, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35.
314 Id. at 439, 399 N.E.2d at 522, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
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establish innocence or guilt, therefore, the court cannot assume
that public access to this hearing will endanger the defendant's
fair -trial rights.3 15 Thus, if such a risk is possible, the defen-
dant has a burden to establish it. The court concluded that the
defendant failed to make this showing; 16 therefore, there was
no sufficient basis to deny the public the right to attend the
hearing.317
The Court of Appeals addressed the pretrial setting again
in Associated Press v. Bell. 8' This was the well-known case
concerning Robert Chambers, who was charged with the mur-
der of Jennifer Levin while engaging in sexual intercourse in
Central Park.319 On the eve of the defendant's Huntley hear-
ing, the defendant moved to close the courtroom on the
grounds that any suppressed statements would threaten the
partiality of a jury. The People objected to the closure, arguing
that the substance of the defendant's statements had already
been disclosed to the public. 2 ° The trial court granted the
defendant's request on the grounds that such disclosure would
prejudice potential jurors.321 However, the court made no spe-
cific findings as to the nature or content of any non-public
statements, the prejudice that closure would prevent, or any
alternatives to closure. 2 The press immediately challenged
the determination, and the appellate division granted its re-
quest." '
After noting that the Supreme Court had not specifically
addressed the First Amendment right of access to pretrial
hearings, the Court of Appeals noted that it had addressed a
Sixth Amendment right, albeit one where the defendant op-
posed closure.3" The court noted the interests in access to
suppression hearings, namely, the defendant's interest in not
exposing jurors to inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence,
315 Id. at 441, 399 N.E.2d at 524, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
311 Id. at 44142, 399 N.E.2d at 525-26, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
317 Leggit, 48 N.Y.2d at 443, 399 N.E.2d at 526, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
318 70 N.Y.2d 32, 510 N.E.2d 313, 517 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1987).
319 Id. at 35, 510 N.E.2d at 314, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 36, 510 N.E.2d at 315, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
32 Id.
3- Bell, 70 N.Y.2d at 36, 510 N.E.2d at 315, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
324 Id. at 37-38, 510 N.E.2d at 316, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 447. See also Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
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and the public's interest in scrutinizing the actions of the po-
lice and prosecutor."~ The court concluded that the risk of
prejudice could not excuse complete denials of public access;
therefore, the defendant had the burden of supporting his
motion for closure by demonstrating, with specific findings,
that (1) there would be a substantial probability of prejudice;
(2) that closure would have prevented that prejudice; and (3)
that reasonable alternatives could not protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial. 26
The Court of Appeals has taken a slightly different ap-
proach in cases involving exclusion of the public and press
during trials. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Rich-
mond Newspapers, the court addressed the pretrial context in
Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc. v. Rosenblatt." In that case,
the People sought to introduce evidence of the defendant's
prior bad acts during the trial." The defense objected and
requested that a hearing be held out of the presence of the jury
and closed to the public.3" The trial judge granted the de-
fense counsel's application and ordered the public excluded."
The Court of Appeals noted that this was an unusual case,
because the effect of inadmissible information is potentially
more damaging, since remedies to exclude jurors exposed to
this information are unavailable.3' Therefore, the court held
that the trial judge's actions were proper. 2 Moreover, by re-
leasing redacted transcripts, the trial judge satisfied any First
Amendment concerns raised by the press.'
In the case of trials where a party is seeking the partial
closure of the trial for the testimony of a particular witness,
there are different policy implications. For instance, the Court
of Appeals has addressed several cases where the victim of a
rape or sexual assault has sought to exclude the public or
press. From its holdings in these cases we can establish that it
' Bell, 70 N.Y.2d at 38, 510 N.E.2d at 316, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
' Id. at 38-39, 510 N.E.2d at 317, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
92 A.D.2d 232, 459 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dept. 1983).
32 Id. at 233, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
"2 Id- at 233, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
0 Id at 233, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
33 Id at 233, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
' Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 92 A.D.2d at 235, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
m Id, at 237, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
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is permissible to close the court even when no one is present at
the time,334 or where the only spectators are the defendant's
family and friends.3 5 This has been justified on the grounds
that it aids in the fact-finding process.336 However, the court
has stressed on several occasions that this use of the judge's
discretion should not be taken lightly.37 Therefore, it has
placed on judges the affirmative obligation of inquiry into the
exact nature of the witness' proffered reasons for closure.338
In the case of undercover officers, a whole new set of con-
siderations arise. Balanced against the defendant's public trial
right is the undercover police officer's concerns for his own
safety as well as his continued ability to operate in those situa-
tions.339 In such cases, the burden is on the state to establish
a specific threat to the police officer.340 Moreover, it is the
judge's obligation to make specific inquiry into both the nature
of the threat as well as the police officer's current duties in
order to determine if closure is justified.3" It has been the
opinion of the Court of Appeals that this type of information
satisfies the test in Waller."4
Against this backdrop, the New York Court of Appeals
heard the case of People v. Ramos.343 In this case, the defen-
dant was arrested in a buy-and-bust operation, and, after a
jury trial, was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled sub-
stance in the third degree.' The trial court closed the court-
room during the undercover agent's testimony.3 45 The officer
'. People v. Glover, 60 N.Y.2d 783, 785, 457 N.E.2d 783, 784, 469 N.Y.S.2d
677, 678 (1983).
' People v. Joseph, 59 N.Y.2d 496, 499, 452 N.E.2d 1243, 1245, 465 N.Y.S.2d
915, 917 (1983).
Id. at 499, 452 N.E.2d at 1245, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
People v. Clemons, 78 N.Y.2d 48, 52, 574 N.E.2d 1039, 1041, 571 N.Y.S.2d
433, 435 (1991).
Id. at 52, 574 N.E.2d at 1041, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 435. See also People v.
Mateo, 73 N.Y.2d 928, 929-30, 536 N.E.2d 1146, 1146-47, 539 N.Y.S.2d 727, 727-28
(1989).
People v. Pearson, 82 N.Y.2d 436, 440-41, 624 N.E.2d 1027, 1029-30, 604
N.Y.S.2d 932, 934-35 (1993).
3'0 Id. at 442-43, 624 N.E.2d at 1030-31, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
341 Id. at 443, 624 N.E.2d at 1031, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
31 See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984).
311 1997 WL 362871 (1997). The case was heard with a companion case People
u. Ayala.
3" People v. Ayala, 232 A.D.2d 312, 649 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dept. 1996).
34 Id.
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had testified at a Hinton hearing that he was currently en-
gaged in undercover operations in the area where he arrested
the defendant, that the area was accessible to the courthouse,
and that he (the officer), feared for his safety."5 Moreover,
the officer testified that he had previously been threatened
outside the very same courthouse in an unrelated drug
case. 1 7 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed
the trial court's closure order and also held that the trial judge
was not obligated to sua sponte consider alternatives to clo-
sure.
4
Applying the first prong of the Waller test, the Court of
Appeals concluded that by identifying certain precincts in
which the undercover officer was recently active and expected
to return imminently was sufficiently specific to demonstrate
an overriding interest."9 It reasoned that police officers can-
not always have advance notice of the precise location to which
they will be assigned, and the officer's specification of certain
precincts was akin to identifying the particular neighborhoods
in which he continued to be active.mo Therefore, the record
demonstrated a sufficient link between testifying in open court
and being recognized by residents of those neighborhoods in
which the officer worked undercover."1 Moreover, the fact
that the officer used a private entrance to enter the courtroom
confirmed his claim that he feared being identified. 2
Next, the court moved on to alternatives to closing the
proceeding. First, it noted that Waller requires the trial court
to consider reasonable alternatives to closure, and that the
Second Circuit had concluded that this imposes an affirmative
duty on trial courts to raise alternatives sua sponte and place
their consideration of them on the record. However, the




'" Ramos, 1997 WL 362871, *26-27. The overriding interest being that testify-
ing in open court would compromise his effectiveness as an undercover and threat-
en his safety. Id. at *28.
3" Id at *27.
351 Id
=2 Id. at *27-28.
'' Id. at *28. See Ayala v. Speckard, 89 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1838 (1997).
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court must consider alternatives on the record, or whether it
addressed the issue of who had the burden of suggesting possi-
ble alternatives.354
The court concluded that Waller merely required that the
trial court's factual findings be sufficient to support the clo-
sure. 55 It reasoned that only those parts of the proceedings
that endangered the interests advanced could be closed. There-
fore, the need to restrict closure further would be apparent
from the record and the obligation to consider "alternatives" to
accomplish this was inherent in the court's duty to ensure that
the closure be narrowly tailored to protect those interests.35
On the record of the case, the Court of Appeals concluded
that there were findings adequate to support closure during
the entirety of the undercover's testimony, and that it could be
implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined
that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated inter-
est.35 '7 The court noted that the defendant could suggest alter-
native measures for the court to consider.358 The court was
concerned that a sua sponte rule would place a heavy burden
on trial courts, particularly in buy-and-bust cases, because a
defendant on appeal could likely conjure up another method of
concealing the witness's identity that the trial court
overlooked.359 Moreover, the procedure ultimately selected
might not be considered reasonable by the trial court or the
particular defendant, and their imposition sua sponte could
raise other fair trial concerns. 60
What is most interesting about this opinion is that the
Court of Appeals qualified this decision by saying that the
holding did not "constitute a green light for closing courtrooms
in all buy-and-bust cases," and went on to condemn the routine
practice of closing the courtroom during the testimony of un-
dercover officers.361 It appears to the author that it did so be-
... Ramos, 1997 WL 362871, at *32.
... Id. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
... Ramos, 1997 WL 362871 at *32.
3" Id. at *34.
" Id. However, the burden would be on the defendant to show to the court's
satisfaction that they would eliminate the dangers shown. Id.
9 Id. at *36-37.
o Id. at *37.
"' Ramos, 1997 WL 362871 at *37-38.
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cause it understood the practical realities of criminal trial
practice: faced with a possible sacrifice of his testimony and
safety, a police officer will suggest more particularized fears in
light of the fact that a generalized concern for safety will not
rise to the level of a compelling interest. However, instead of
demanding a more solid nexus between the testimony in open
court and the particularized interest, thus demanding a more
probative judicial inquiry, the Court of Appeals appeared will-
ing to justify closure on the threadbare facts before it.
The Court of Appeals did not seek answers to the following
questions, among others: Is there a connection between the
previous case in which the officer was threatened and the
current one? Has the officer received other threats since the
previous case relating to other testimony he has given? More-
over, the question arises as to whether the officer or other
court personnel have been able to identify anyone attending
the current trial connected to the defendant that would pose a
threat to the safety to the officer. Can the People proffer evi-
dence that the current defendant is part of a larger organiza-
tion that would seek to injure the officer?
If the answers to the above questions are in the affirma-
tive, this would rise to the level of a compelling interest suffi-
cient to justify closure."'2 If the People and the officer cannot
answer yes to the above questions or establish a more particu-
larized connection between the officer's testimony in open court
and harm to the officer in some other way, the trial court
should reject the closure motion.
The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the third and
fourth prongs of the Waller test work together to protect the
defendant's right to a public trial. The court explained that,
the fourth prong, which commands the trial court to make
specific findings in order to facilitate appellate review, accents
the third prong, which instructs the trial court to examine
possible alternatives to closure. By concluding that the facts on
the record implicitly suggest that the trial court examined and
rejected alternatives, the court neglected to apply these princi-
ples. Moreover, by holding that the party objecting to the clo-
sure must suggest alternatives, the Court of Appeals turns the
" See United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1995); United States
v. Scarpelli, 713 F. Supp. 1144, 1145-46 n.2 (N.D. IMI. 1989).
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Sixth Amendment into a sword of the prosecution, instead of a
shield for the defendant.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should bring order to this area of the
law. It could begin by separating its lines of reasoning. The
defendant's rights, embodied in the Sixth Amendment, are his
alone to use as a shield against those seeking to abridge his
rights. The public's rights, contained in the First Amendment,
belong to all. These rights are not implicated in every case.
Yet, in developing a unified approach in the right of access
cases, the Supreme Court invokes both sets of rights at all
times. As a result, the Court has confused the distinct policies
and purposes envisioned for each amendment by the Framers,
and has improperly applied principles that belong to distinct
areas of the law. The result has been a confusing maze of deci-
sions, which raises more questions than it answers, while
building a doctrine on a weak footing. Each successive case
seeks to clarify the right of access, but never establishes a
clear direction upon which practitioners may rely to adequately
practice law.
One amendment must be the victor. Without one being
superior to the other, there will never be a bright line test.
Practically, this can be achieved by the Supreme Court recog-
nizing that all cases fall within either the Estes line of cases or
the Oliver line of cases.
The Supreme Court's failure to recognize a superior right
has caused a lack of developing case law, and has resulted in
decisions that offer no precedential value for lower courts or
practitioners to follow. Until the Court recognizes the superior
right, a consistent line of rulings will never be realized. The
Supreme Court should recognize the practical problems its
hodge podge of muddled reasoning causes to lawyers and dic-
tate a bright line test.
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